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  2  Abstract 
 
This paper evaluates the degree to which Colombian firms face credit restrictions 
that alter their investment decisions. It analyzes whether the evolution of the 
financial sector during the 1990s, characterized by an intense financial 
liberalization, an increase in size and a deepening of the activity, reduced the 
credit restrictions faced by firms and stimulated investment. The paper also 
explores whether, on the contrary, financial restrictions intensified during the 
recent 1998-2000 crisis. The paper provides empirical evidence suggesting that 
Colombian firms are indeed restricted by external resources and are compelled to 
resort to internal resources. The paper demonstrates that financial liberalization 
and the greater credit availability reduced such restrictions, and that the financial 
crisis had a strong and negative effect on investment and its financing. It 
compares the behavior of different groups of firms: (i) firms belonging to 
conglomerates vs. non-conglomerates, and (ii) firms with direct foreign 
investment vs. domestic firms. It shows that both groups face fewer financial 
restrictions and that they benefited less from financial liberalization. Finally, the 
paper evaluates the effects of indebtedness; the results suggest firms acquire debt 
before investing and/or that the acquired debt in the past serves as a sign of good 
credit history for the acquisition of new resources.  
  3    4  1.  Introduction
* 
 
Taking into account information asymmetries, costly monitoring, contract enforcement and 
incentive problems modifies Modigliani and Miller’s view on the determinants of investment. In 
this alternative scenario the capital structure of the firm, average taxes, current profits and 
wealth matter; interest rates affect both the use of capital and the availability of funds, and the 
evolution and efficiency of the financial sector produces a “financial accelerator” that can affect 
cycles and growth (Hubbard, 1998).  
Schumpeter (1934) recognized the potential effect of the financial sector in promoting 
economic growth, one of the robust conclusions in the analysis of King and Levine (1993, 2001). 
He also argued that credit affects productivity more than capital accumulation, a conclusion 
recently verified by Levine, Loayza and Beck (2000). A strong financial sector reduces global 
risk, allows progress in the mobilization of savings and in the allocation of capital funds, and 
increases the monitoring of managers. In addition, the financial sector seems to play a large role 
in the determination of cycles. Kindleberger (1978), for example, illustrated the importance of 
irrational financial markets in economic crises and Bernanke (1983) showed that debt crises and 
the collapse of the banking system were central factors in the explanation of the Great 
Depression of the 1930s. A strong financial sector is associated with macroeconomic stability 
and poverty reduction.
1  
The analysis of the relation between financial constraints, investment and firm growth 
was pioneered by Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) and has been studied more recently by 
Gallego and Loayza (2000) for Chile, by Harris, Schiantarelli and Siregar (1994) for Indonesia, 
by Jaramillo, Schiantarelli and Weiss (1996) for Ecuador, by Gelos and Werner (1999) for 
Mexico and by Laeven (2001) for a group of 13 underdeveloped countries; by Love (2001) for 
40 developed and underdeveloped countries, and by Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1996 and 1999) 
for a large sample of developed and less developed countries. Common results in the literature 
show that financial constraints have decreased after most liberalization episodes, being indeed 
                                                           
* With the collaboration of Camila Aguilar, Maria L. Guerra and Mónica Parra. Juan José Echavarría is the director 
of Fedesarrollo and Maria A. Arbeláez is the editor of Coyuntura Económica, Fedesarrrollo’s quarterly publication. 
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  5  large for those firms where information and monitoring are more costly: small and recently 
created companies, firms not belonging to conglomerates, and domestic as opposed to foreign 
firms.  
The Colombian experience of the last two decades is used to further develop an 
understanding of this area. Colombian domestic investment grew much more than in any other 
Latin American country during the liberalization period of 1990-95, when capital flows and 
domestic credit expanded drastically, with a sharp reduction in 1998-99. Were the liberalization 
episodes of the 1990s important in explaining the investment boom? Did financial restrictions 
increase during the crisis of 1998-99?
2  
Section 2 of the paper reviews the evolution of the financial sector in Colombia and 
shows three relevant features: i) the process of financial liberalization undertaken during the 
1990s was strong; ii) the financial sector and the capital market still remain very backward; iii) 
the crisis of 1998-2000 was deep, even when compared to the previous crisis of 1982-85. This 
section builds indexes of activity, size and liberalization that will be useful in the empirical 
analysis. 
Section 3 presents some theoretical considerations, discusses the data and the estimation 
techniques, and explains the empirical results for Colombia. It shows that firms are financially 
constrained, that the financial liberalization of the 1990s and the large amounts of new credit 
reduced constraints, and that the recent crisis of 1998-2000 had a strong impact on investment 
and finance. Also compared is the behavior of different groups of firms: firms belonging to 
conglomerates vs. those with no conglomerate affiliation; and firms with foreign investment vs. 
domestic firms.  It is found that conglomerate-affiliated firms and multinationals are less 
financially constrained; also, they benefited less from financial liberalization.  
Those results should be expected in a financially constrained environment. The 
conglomerate is an organization partially designed to cope with information and contract 
enforcement problems, and firms belonging to a conglomerate are less likely to be financially 
constrained. They can rely on the financial resources of the group, the diversification of the 
group being an added bonus.  Much less research has been done on the behavior of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
1 According to Easterly, Islam and Stiglitz (2001), a doubling of private credit from 20 percent of GDP to 40 percent 
reduces the standard deviation of growth from 4 to 3 percent per annum. This improvement is not sustained with 
further financial deepening. 
2 See also Tybout (1983) and Echavarría and Tenjo (1993). 
  6  multinationals, but their connection with the parent company should facilitate access to credit 
and financial resources. 
 
2. Financial Liberalization and the Relative Development of the Colombian 
Financial System 
 
The 1970s and 1980s 
 
During the 1970s the Colombian financial sector operated under very restrictive conditions. The 
regulatory framework was rigid, institutions were overregulated, and the Government tightly 
controlled the sector. Interest rates and credit allocation were subject to strict administrative 
controls. Directed credit to specific sectors at subsidized interest rates was an important 
proportion of total credit, and forced investment played a negative role in credit and credit 
institutions.  
Most forced investment had a below-market return and intermediation margins were high 
(and tended to increase), negatively affecting financial institutions’ ability to make profits. 
Reserve requirements were the main tool for monetary policy, with high levels and large 
volatility. Four commercial banks accounted for 43 percent of deposits and 45 percent of total 
assets.
3  
The Mexican debt crisis of 1982 and its aftermath hit Colombia much less than other 
Latin American countries,
4 but there were important effects nonetheless, particularly during the 
first part of the decade. The first casualties were observed in 1982, when deteriorating 
macroeconomic conditions negatively affected the performance of financial entities. A 
precarious regulatory framework, which combined repressive features with weak supervision, 
aggravated the distress of a very underdeveloped financial sector. 
The financial crisis of 1982-85 was challenging. It was essentially a solvency crisis, with 
a portfolio deterioration aggravated by a simultaneous weakening of equity bases. Non-
performing loans increased significantly in relation to total assets. The profitability of the 
institutions was strongly affected by the high provisions they had to undertake in 1985. Only 99 
entities remained by 1986 out of the 111 functioning entities operating in 1980. Private 
                                                           
3 The dominant presence of government in the financial sector was evident, owning 57 percent of the capital of the 
commercial banks, 81percent of Financial Corporations, 27 percent of the capital of Mortgage Corporations, CAVs, 
and 19 percent of the Commercial Financing Corporations. 
4 See Fischer (1988), Edwards (1995). 
  7  commercial banks, financial corporations and some CFCs were the most adversely affected, and 
the profitability of the financial sector fell abruptly in 1985. The measures adopted to overcome 
the crisis were oriented towards reducing solvency risk of the financial institutions, giving the 
government power to nationalize without compensation any financial entity undergoing severe 
crises; reserve requirements were lowered, and interest rates on forced investments were 
increased.  
The Central Bank played a primary role by providing liquidity and solvency support, 
giving credit to the shareholders of financial institutions and to firms,
5 and relieving firms that 
had acquired foreign debt.
6 All those policies helped to overcome the crisis, but the state ended 
up as the main owner of the financial system, the undesired consequence of the whole package of 
measures. By the end of the decade the government owned approximately 66 percent of the 




A broad-based package of reforms was implemented in the early 1990s, aimed at enhancing 
competition, allowing the operation of foreign banks in the country, increasing reliance on 
market instruments,
7 and reducing government and monetary authorities’ intervention in the 
financial system. The cornerstone in the area was the financial reform introduced by Law 45 of 
1990, followed by Law 35 of 1993. 
The financial reforms covered four main fronts: interest rate policy, credit policy, forced 
investment and monetary policy. Interest rates for savings deposits, for mortgage loans and for a 
large part of other loans were liberalized, and the Central Bank’s capacity to intervene in interest 
rates was limited. Credit subsidies were phased out. Most interest rates were converted from 
fixed to variable terms at the beginning of 1987, and were gradually increased to market levels. 
Ceilings remained and are still in place today. 
Concerning monetary policy, the Constitutional Reform of 1991 increased the autonomy 
of the Central Bank (Alesina, Carrasquilla and Steiner, 2000). Efforts were also made to 
                                                           
5 Financial capitalization (Resolution 42, 1983 and Resolution 60, 1984 of the Board). Board Resolutions 16 and 
116 of 1983 (of the Board) created a capitalization fund for firms; subsidized credit was given to textiles, steel, and 
to the construction sector. 
6 Board Resolution 33 of 1984 of the Board. 
7 The package included Tax Reform (Law 75 of 1986), Foreign Investment Reform (Law 9 of 1991), Labor Reform 
(Law 50 of 1990) and Social Security Reform (Law 100 of 1993). 
  8  strengthen the role of open-market operations (OMAs) and to reduce considerably reserve 
requirements, which currently average approximately 5 percent, in comparison to 16.7 percent in 
January of 1994.  
Finally, several measures of supervision and prudential regulation were taken to adjust 
the balance sheets of financial intermediaries to correctly reflect price changes and new 
investment in the sector, norms on provisions and non-performing loans were made stricter, and 
financial entities were required to maintain minimum solvency ratios. The overall result was a 
more liberalized and better-supervised financial sector.  
Figure 1presents the evolution of the liberalization process based on a compound index of 
domestic liberalization proposed by Lora and Barrera (1997, updated by Lora, 2001) based on 
the relation between reserves and deposits, the evolution of interest rate controls, and the 
imposition of Basel-type supervisory practices. The domestic liberalization index appears almost 
like a dummy variable, with a value of zero during the 1980s and 1 in the 1990s. The capital 
account liberalization index proposed by Morley, Machado and Pettinato (1999), on the other 
hand, shows a smoother trend, with the highest slope in 1990-95. The compound index is an 
arithmetic average of both.   
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Reserves to Deposit Index
 
 
Figure 2 presents the Laeven (2001) index of liberalization. It assigns a value of 0 or 1 to 
each of six variables: interest rates, entry barriers, reserve requirements, credit controls, 
privatizations and prudential regulation.
 The index is the sum of the six variables; it takes a 
minimum value of 0 in one extreme case, and a maximum value of 6 when all six variables are 
“liberalized” and prudential regulations are adopted. The pattern obtained is relatively similar to 




                                                           
8 The principal laws considered for this exercise were: interest rates (Decree 2994 of December 14, 1990); entry 
barriers (Law 45 of December 18, 1990); reserve requirements (Central Bank Resolution 7, 1993); credit controls (a 
series of decrees which partially eliminated forced investments and directed credit, FINAGRO’s investments were 
regulated in 1990); and privatization.  The most important prudential regulation measures were adopted in 1989. 




















































Variables included: interest rates, entry barriers, reserve requirements, 
credit controls, privatizations and prudential regulation.
 
Despite a great deal of liberalization on some fronts, a number of policies have gone in 
the opposite direction. As shown in Figure 3, for example, forced investments decreased until 
1992 but increased in the following years.
9 The importance of directed credit decreased until 
1997 but increased thereafter. FINAGRO (agriculture) and BANCOLDEX (exports) increased 
their directed credit in absolute terms. FOGAFIN (the financial sector guarantee fund) also 
exerted additional influence, particularly after 1997, when a large amount of resources were used 
to alleviate the pressure on the financial sector. 
 
                                                           
9 The only forced investments that still remain were the type A and B bonds for the agricultural sector (FINAGRO). 
In the year 2000, the Board of the Central Bank established that these forced investments would be realized as a 
function of the liabilities subject to reserve requirements, deducting from these the amount corresponding to 
required reserves. According to Hernández and Tolosa (2001), this captures the spirit of the Law 16 of 1990, 
whereby Finagro was created and investments were made compulsory inversely to the cost of the liabilities. 
  11  Figure 3. Directed Credit and Forced Investment 
DIRECTED CREDIT AND FORCED INVESTMENTS
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Size and Activity 
Levine, Loayza and Beck (2000) consider “activity,” the stock of credit from the financial to the 
private sector, the “best” index of financial development. Gallego and Loayza (2000), on the 
other hand, use “activity” and “size” (the relation between assets of the financial sector and 
GDP) in their analysis of the impact of the financial sector in Chile.  
The evolution of both variables is described in Figure 4 for Colombia. The financial 
system was relatively small during the 1980s, with size accounting for 35-40 percent of GDP. 
The same trend is observed in activity, with a weak expansion of credit during the 1980s, and a 
large expansion after the financial liberalization of the 1990s. The Colombian “credit boom” of 
1991-97 was followed by a deep contraction during the following years, where a credit crunch 
could have taken place.
10 
                                                           
10 Fischer (1988) and Echeverry and Salazar (1999).  





























Sources: Superbancaria, Banco de la República and Minhacienda.
size: assets/GDP
activity: stock of credit to the private sector/GDP
 
 
Financial reforms not only increased credit directly, but also indirectly through their 
impact on capital flows. The promotion of a larger role for foreign capital in the national 
financial system (in 1990 and Law 9 of 1991)
11 could be considered among the “pull” factors that 
increased capital flows and the presence of foreign banks in Colombia. Other important pull 
factors were the package of “structural” reforms undertaken during the first part of the 1990s and 
the very high interest rates of mid-1991 (39 percent for deposit rates).  Calvo, Leiderman and 
Reinhart (1995) and Corbo and Hernández (2000) consider the relative importance of pull and 
push factors in Latin America during the 1990s. 
Figure 5 shows the close association between capital flows and domestic credit in 
Colombia, a very relevant issue since capital flows to Colombia increased much faster than to 
other Latin American countries between 1990 and 1997, and also fell faster in 1997-2000.  The 
close association between capital flows, credit and growth has been recently stressed by Calvo 
(2000). 
 
                                                           
11 Before the liberalization of the 1990s, the entrance of foreign capital was restricted to 49 percent of the capital of 
the financial entity, a limit later eliminated. The external indebtedness norms for local agents were made more 
flexible, allowing for limit-free acquisition of debt with foreign banks. 
  13  Figure 5. Capital Flows and Real Credit 
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The Crisis of 1998-2000  
 
The financial crisis of 1998-2000 was much worse than any other crisis recorded in Colombia 
during the last decades, even much worse than the previous crisis of 1982-85 when the financial 
sector was also badly bruised. The deterioration of some indicators that began in 1996, especially 
in the mortgage sector,
12 was aggravated in 1998. The financial crisis was mainly induced by the 
economic recession of 1998 and 1999, the significant drop in national income, a spectacular 
increase in interest rates, and the crisis of the construction sector (Carrasquilla and Arbeláez, 
2000).  
Bad loans and non-productive assets grew significantly (non-performing loans over total 
loans reached 12 percent in 1999). The increase in credit risk and liquidity risk caused by deposit 
reduction led to an important fall in credit which reached a negative real growth rate of –7.0 
percent in December 1998 and averaged –12.5 percent in 1999. Solvency deteriorated and losses 
increased. The recent crisis has been deeper in public banks and Mortgage Corporations (CAVs) 
than in domestic and foreign private banks, with bailout measures mainly oriented to those 
sectors. In any case, it seems the government’s package has helped to ease financial distress. 
                                                           
12 Mortgage Corporations were hardly affected by the financial reform, which included the elimination of the 
liquidity fund FAVI and the exclusive role of CAVs in having remunerated deposit accounts. 
  14  Solvency has recovered and credit stopped decreasing.  Profitability in the financial sector 
(Figure 6) dropped abruptly after 1997, with negative figures in 1998, 1999 and 2000. It is not 
lower today than in 1985, the worse year of the 1980s, but it is less related to provision policies
13 
and has lasted much longer.  
 
Figure 6.  
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1 Profitability = Profits / Total Assets
Sources: SuperBancaria , calculations by Fedesarrollo  
 
The Colombian Financial Sector and the Stock Market Today: Still Far Behind 
 
Despite the important liberalization process described in the last section, the international 
comparisons available suggest that the Colombian financial sector remains small and inefficient. 
Thus, Colombia is behind the Latin American average in 7 out of the 8 variables considered in 
Demirguc-Kunt and Levine  (1999), some of them illustrated in Figure 7, the only exception 
being “credit of financial institutions to private sector/GDP” in which the two practically 
coincide. Colombia is behind Chile and the world mean for all 8 variables, and behind Brazil for 
5 of them.  
 
                                                           
13 Provisions were increased only later in 1999, as a preventive and prudential measure.   
  15  Figure 7.  
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The previous quantitative results agree with those of a recent qualitative survey 
conducted by the Inter-American Development Bank and Fedesarrollo to 50-100 
“representative” business people in 10 countries.
14 The results are reported in Arbeláez and 
Echavarría (2001). Colombia lags behind in most areas, from the influence of government 
controls, to the possibility of obtaining a loan with only a good business plan and no collateral 
(minimum value for Paraguay). The importance of retained earnings among the sources of funds 
is also greater. The available literature in the area suggests, finally, that the equity market is still 
more underdeveloped than the banking-financial sector (Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 1999).  
 
3.  Evolution and Impact of Financial Constraints in Colombia  
 
This section evaluates the impact and importance of financial constraints in Colombia, using the 
investment equation framework developed by authors such as Hubbard (1998) and Schiantarelli 
(1996).  Constraints should certainly matter, given the large importance of information 
                                                           
14 Colombia, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Uruguay, Jamaica, and 
Trinidad and Tobago. 
  16  asymmetries, costly monitoring, contract enforcement and incentive problems in a financially 
underdeveloped country.  
This section goes further, however, and explores how much financial constraints 
decreased during the liberalization episodes of the first part of the 1990s and increased again 
during the recent and strong crisis of 1998-99. Did the Colombian experience show the positive 
consequences present in Chile, Mexico or Indonesia, or the fairly mild results reached in 
Ecuador? The section finally explores whether, as expected, those firms belonging to a 
conglomerate or with some direct foreign investment (FDI) face lower financial constraints. 
 
The Investment Function and Main Results 
 
Following Laeven (2000), an investment equation is estimated, derived from the first order 
conditions of a firm’s value maximizing problem in a financially constrained environment.   
Based on Gilchrist and Himmelberg’s (1998) basic setup, assuming quadratic and persistent 
adjustment costs as in Love (2000), and linearizing the underlying functions of the marginal 
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Where: 
i:   firm 
t:   year 
I:   investment (gross investment, absolute change in K) 
K:   capital stock (machinery, plant and equipment)  
MPK:  marginal productivity of capital  
FIN:  a proxy for liquidity   
LEV: leverage 
 
The specification above requires a measure of the marginal profitability of capital 
(MPK). As in Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1998), it is assumed that the underlying production 
function is a Cobb-Douglas. Under this setup the ratio of net sales to capital can be used as a 
  17  proxy for MPK. A distinctive feature of this model is that lagged investment appears as a 
determinant of current investment. In a framework with perfect capital markets current 
investment should not depend on lagged investment, but investment ratios can show high 
persistence when firms make arrangements that are costly to cancel (Laeven, 2001). The interest 
rate does not appear here, because it cancels out when solving the model. 
This framework can test for departures from the basic Modigliani and Miller (1958) 
framework, where a firm’s capital structure is independent of its value, where internal and 
external funds are perfect substitutes, and where investment decisions rely exclusively on 
expected profitability rather than financing choices. With imperfect capital markets, financing 
constraints may arise and internal and external funds are not usually substitutes. The nature of 
these could come from various sources such as information asymmetries, costly monitoring, 
contract enforcement and incentive problems, among others.  These factors can lead to 
explanations of why investment decisions are in practice linked to firms’ value and finance, 
especially in firms with higher information costs.   
Hence, in a financially constraint environment, the signs of sales /k (proxying MPK) and 
liquidity in equation 1 should be positive. There is no a priori expected sign for leverage-debt. 
The positive relation obtained below can occur if firms obtain new loans (and become more 
indebted) before they invest, or if debt in the past act as a signal of creditworthiness to the 
financial intermediaries. This is the reasoning used by Harris, Schiantarelli and Siregar (1994) 
for the positive sign they find for large firms and conglomerates in Indonesia. Most authors find 
a negative sign for this relation, however, indicating that very indebted firms do not get credit 
easily.
15  
Two alternative proxies are used for FIN: the stock of “liquidity” defined as current assets 
– current liabilities and “cash flow” defined as operational profits.  We obtain best results for the 
stock of liquidity suggesting that firms expecting high investment in the future will accumulate 
cash stock to use up when the opportunities arrive. Since holding cash is costly to the firm (it 
offers a low return) firms will accumulate cash stock only if they expect to be financially 
constrained in the future. This position agrees with the arguments given by Greenwald and 
                                                           
15 A negative relation between investment and debt is found by Gallego and Loayza (2000), Devereux and 
Schiantarelli (1989) and Jaramillo, Schiantarelli and Weiss (1996). Also, by Harris, Schiantarelli and Siregar (1994) 
for small firms. Laeven (2001) does not find evidence that small firms suffer from leverage costs.  
  18  Stiglitz  (1988) and with the concept of “financial slack” in Myers and Majluj  (1984). It is also 
the concept used by Love (2001).  
There is no consensus in this area, however. Hsiao and Tahmiscioglu (1997), for 
example, argue that both variables are important: investment is determined by profitability 
considerations in the long run, and liquidity is an important determinant in the short run.
16 Hoshi, 
Kashyap and Scharfstein (1990) find a positive influence for both variables,
17 and the results in 
Devereux and Schiantarelli (1989) and Harris, Schiantarelli and Siregar (1994) are the opposite 
of those presented here. 
Also of interest are the cross products of MPK, FIN and LEV with the macro indexes on 
liberalization, size and activity presented in Sections 2. This shows that the favorable 
development of the financial sector during the 1990s indeed decreased the financial constraints 
faced by the firms, or affected conglomerates or multinationals in different ways. The results are 
partially consistent with other studies in the area. In particular, the liberalization process reduced 
financial constraints in Chile for all firms, and in Mexico and Indonesia for small firms.
18 Laeven 
(2001) finds similar results for small firms in his sample of 12 countries.  This did not happen in 
Ecuador, however, because subsidized credit for small firms disappeared after the liberalization 
process (Jaramillo, Schiantarelli and Weiss, 1996). 
Results using the liberalization indexes are more significant than those using size or 
activity of the financial sector. This result in part confirms that a successful financial reform goes 
beyond increased credit availability but also has an impact on credit allocation. A successful 
financial reform removes controls on market allocation and leads to greater access to credit, 
reducing the premium paid on external finance. It reduces information asymmetries between 
borrowers and lenders and facilitates the reallocation of funds between firms. In more concrete 
terms, the reforms allow banks to set interest rates, abolish directed credits from official banks to 
preferential sectors, eliminate credit ceilings and forced lending, reduce reserve requirements, 
improve creditors’ rights, and stimulate securities markets. Domestic financial reforms were also 
accompanied by capital account liberalization in Latin America.  
                                                           
16 Their definition of cash flow (income after tax and interest + depreciation) and liquidity (cash flow less dividends) 
is, however, different from that presented here. 
17 Again, though, their definition of the variables differs from ours. They define cash flow as income after tax + 
depreciation – dividend payment and the stock of liquidity as short-term securities. 
18 Gallego and Loayza (2000), Gelos and Werner (1999) and  Harris, Schiantarelli and Siregar (1994). 
  19  We are finally interested in the cross products between conglomerates and multinationals 
with the indexes of liberalization and financial development. We find that those groups are less 
financially constrained and benefited less with liberalization. Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein   
(1991), Schiantarelli and Sembenelli  (1995), and Cho (1995) also find important interactions 




We use information provided by the Superintendencia de Sociedades and the Superintendencia 
de Valores (after 1995) in Colombia, with characteristics similar to the information used by 
Jaramillo, Schiantarelli and Weiss (1996) for Ecuador. The Superintendencia database contains 
balance sheets and income statements for eight to ten thousand firms reporting each year, with 
close to 25 percent of firms and 40 percent of sales in manufacturing. The Supervalores database 
contains balance sheets and income statements for close to 140 “very large” firms,
19 42 percent 
of them in manufacturing (47 perfect in sales, figures for 1999). In total, we worked with an 
unbalanced panel for 1,488 firms.
20   
The information on conglomerates comes from a special study undertaken by the 
Superintendencia de Sociedades (2000). The study presents the list of 887 “parents” and 1,983 
“subsidiaries” existing in the country in the year 2000; we were able to identify balance sheets 
and income statements for most of the firms and work with those firms in manufacturing. We 
were also able to classify the different “groups” according to their ownership (or not) of “banks” 
(here defined as firms in the financial sector in general). The information on foreign investment 
comes from the census available at the Central Bank in 1998. We were not able to track the 
history of each firm through time, and a firm not belonging to a conglomerate or with FDI in the 
previous years will be erroneously considered in those two special groups.
21  
                                                           
19 Average sales in 1999 were 22 times larger for the firms listed (Supervalores) than for the firms non-listed 
(Supersociedades). 
20 In at least some of the years in the period 1978-1999 1,972 firms reported information; 484 of them were removed 
because of lack of sufficient information in the regression analysis. 
21 Further research could shed light on the importance of different groups through time, but it is not easy to reconcile 
the information available in the few studies available. See Superintendencia de Sociedades (1978) and Fernández 
(1992). We know a little more in the area of foreign investment. Thus, the information derived from the 
Superintendencia de Sociedades reveals that 175 firms with (some) foreign investment in 1999, but not in 1995, 
represent 13.5 percent of sales. Of course, some firms disappeared: the 77 firms with foreign direct investment in 
1995 but not in 1999 represent 6.7 percent of total sales.  
  20  Table 1 shows the relative weight of conglomerates and firms with FDI (in 1999, results 
do not change much when we consider other years). Those firms belonging to a conglomerate 
represent 10.6 percent of the number of firms, and 36.9 percent of sales. Firms with FDI 
represent 16.4 percent (number) and 45 percent (sales),
22 and the weight of firms belonging to 
conglomerates with and without banks is similar. Finally, firms created before 1970 represent 
more than half of sales, and those created during the 1990s represent only 9.2 percent. The 
comparison between number and sales indicate that firms belonging to conglomerates, firms with 
some FDI and “old” firms are relatively large. 
 
Table 1. Relative Weight in Sales, Different Groups of Firms in 1999 
# Sales
I. Conglomerates vs Non-Conglomerates
Conglomerates with bank 2.3 18.6
Conglomerates without bank 8.3 18.2
Non-Conglomerates 89.4 63.1
Total (%) 100.0 100.0
II. Firms with Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)
16.4 45.0
III. Year of Creation





Source: Superintendencia de Sociedades and Supervalores,
firms with information in 1999.  
 
Evolution of the Key Variables  
 
Gross investment in Colombia reached in 1995 and 1999 its highest/lowest levels in decades 
(Figure 8), extreme levels even when compared to other Latin American countries. Contrary to 
the 1980s, the volatility of investment was also higher than in most Latin American countries.
23 
                                                           
22 The information derived from Superintendencia de Sociedades on the relative weight of firms with (some) foreign 
direct investment is relatively consistent with figures provided by the Central Bank, with a participation of 47.1 
percent in manufacturing in 1999. Figures for other sectors would be, in descending order: energy, water and gas 
(62.6 percent), fishing (60.9 percent), transport (44.8 percent), banks and financial activities (33.2 percent), services 
(28 percent), commerce (26.3 percent), agriculture (15 percent), hotels and tourism (12.6 percent), health (11.9 
percent), construction (7 percent). 
23 The standard deviation of investment /GDP in Colombia was 0.93 and 4.09 in the 1980s and 1990s. The value for 
the 1980s is less than half, and the value for the 1990s is more than double of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, 
Ecuador or Mexico.  
  21  Finally, the second part of the figure shows that the participation of the private sector in total 
investment has been increasing for decades in the average Latin American country but not in 
Colombia. 
 
Figure 8. Gross Capital Formation in Colombia and Latin America, 1978-99 
1
Gross total capital formation  Gross total capital formation 



























































Colombia Latin America & Caribbean
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2
Private fixed investment  Private fixed investment 


























































Colombia Latin America & Caribbean
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators
 
 
Figure 9 shows the evolution of the median value for I/K and I/A, where K corresponds 
to plant and equipment, and A to total assets (we will refer mostly to the variables divided by K, 
the ones we use in the paper).  The pattern does not differ much from that of Figure 8, except that 
the peak occurs in 1992 instead of 1994. The value reached in 1999 is lower than in any other 
year in both Figures. Figure 10 shows the evolution of sales, debt, liquidity (stock of current 




                                                           
24 The number of firms considered changes from 196 in 1979 to 474 in 1990. It increases very fast during the 
following years, reaching 1672 in 1999. 
  22  Figure 9. Investment in Manufacturing, Median 





















I: investment in machinery and equipment; K: plant and equipment at the end of the year; A: 











 falls between 1979 and 1983, increases during the rest of the 1980s, 







relatively similar, though more stable during the 1980s. Liquidity has been following in the long 
run, with some expansions in particular sub-periods like 1981-85 or 1990-92. There has also 
been a strong fall in cash flow – profits, at least during the 1990s, with bad years in 1983 and 













been much less marked. 
There is the idea in Colombia that the real sector massively contracted debt during the 
1990s, and that the recent recession of 1998-2000 was partially the result of the “bursting of the 
bubble.” The results do not confirm this idea and, on the contrary, show that levels of debt 
decreased during the 1990s. Table A.1 explores further the issue and shows that one of the 
multiple relations considered (debt with the financial sector/sales for manufacturing – not for all 
sectors) did debt increased, and only for large firms. 
 
  23  Figure 10. Sales, Debt, Liquidity and Cash Flow-Profits in Manufacturing (Medians) 
















K: plant and equipment at the end of the year; A: total assetts at the end of the year; median 
for all those firms with information each year
S/Kt-1 (left)
S/A t-1 (right)


















K: plant and equipment at the end of the year; A: total assetts at the end of the year; median 
for all those firms with information each year
Liq/Kt (left)
Liq/A t (right)





















K: plant and equipment at the end of the year; A: total assetts at the end of the year; median 
for all those firms with information each year
CF/Kt (left)
CF/A t (right)





















K: plant and equipment at the end of the year; A: total assetts at the end of the year; median 





  24  Medians for Different Groups of Firms 
 
Table 2 presents the median values for the relevant variables (outliers removed, see Annex B) for 
close to 900 and 1,900 firms reporting in 1992 and 1999, respectively. It shows that sales (S/K) 
are larger for multinationals, firms belonging to conglomerates and “very old” firms (created 
before 1970). Multinationals are more liquid (Liq/k) than others, and firms created during the 
1990s less liquid than others. Finally, those firms created during the 1980s have higher debt 
ratios (D/K) in 1999.  
The other differences are not statistically significant, though all variables considered in 
the table are larger for multinationals in 1999, and most of them in 1992 (except debt; similar 
figures for sales). Firms belonging to conglomerates have higher liquidity (L/K) and lower debt 
(D/K). Finally, all variables except S/K are lower for the firms created during the 1990s.  
All figures are lower in 1999 than in 1992, and especially for I/K, a result consistent with 
the information provided in Figures 13 and 14. Thus, I/K in 1999 is only 6 percent and 13 
percent of the value in 1992 for conglomerates and non-conglomerates; it is 9 percent and 6 
percent for firms with and without FDI; and only 5 percent for firms created during the 1990s. 
“Non-conglomerates” present the largest fall among all groups in CF/K and Liq/K. The fall in 
D/K was largest for the firms created before 1970 and during the 1970s. 






Table 2. Median Values for 1992 and 1999  
I/K S/K CF/K Liq/K Dt/K I/K S/K CF/K Liq/K Dt/K
I.Conglomerates
Conglomerate 0.378 15.095** 0.493 0.882 2.764 0.052 3.772 0.099 0.501 2.076
Non-Conglomerate 0.389 16.157 0.388 1.072 2.665 0.026 4.424 0.208 0.759 1.911
II. Multinationals
Without FDI 0.384 16.018 0.363 0.962 2.700 0.027 4.274* 0.186 0.705** 1.894
With FDI 0.392 15.998 0.578 1.280 2.585 0.035 4.867 0.220 0.849 2.029
III.Year of Creation
Before 1970 0.417 17.714 0.543 1.266 2.913 0.030 4.914*** 0.215 0.910 1.930
1970s 0.341 16.044 0.384 1.061 2.695 0.031 4.179 0.211 0.783 1.841
1980s 0.341 10.746 0.286 0.575 2.316 0.025 4.074 0.188 0.677 2.000**
1990s 0.327 33.693 0.218 0.526 2.295 0.018 3.853 0.136*** 0.485*** 1.904*
I: investement; K: stock of plant, machinery and equipment at the beginning of the year; S: sales; CF: cash-flow (operational profits); Liq: liquidity (current ass
minus current liabilities); D: total liabilities
***, **, *: significant at 1%, 5% or 10% respectively
Methodology: significance levels were obtained with a regression between the variable and dummys for each category; outliers removed previously, following
rules described in Annex 1




  26   
Correlation Matrix 
 
Table 3 shows the Spearman rank correlation between the variables we will consider in the 
regression analysis, for close to 17400 observations included in our unbalanced panel data. 
Correlations are relatively high (i.e., > 70%) for S/K and D/K. The correlation with sales (S/K) is 
similar for the stock of liquidity (Liq/K) and for cash flow – operational profits. Other criteria 
will be needed to choose among those two variables. 
 
Table 3. Spearman Rank Correlations 
Spearman Rank Correlations
I/K St/Kt-1 CF/K Liq/K D/K
I/K 1
S/K 0.26 1
CF/K 0.09 0.58 1
Liq/K -0.07 0.59 0.52 1
D/K -0.04 0.71 0.37 0.52 1
Source: Superintendencia Bancaria and Supervalores, close to 17400
observations




The dynamic investment models considered above are likely to suffer from endogeneity since 
investment and cash flow or liquidity could be simultaneously determined and investment may 
feed back into sales. In fact, most variables pertaining to the firm, such as output and cash flow, 
are potentially endogenous since they depend on the technology stock  (Hayashi and Inoue, 
1982.  
Arellano and Bond’s (1988) Generalized Methods of Moments technique (GMM) allows 
the use of lagged dependent variables and controls for unobserved individual effects and 
endogeneity of explanatory variables. Their methodology considers the possibility of 
simultaneous determination and reverse causality.  The GMM estimator in differences, the 
technique we will use in this section, uses  (yi,t-2, yi,t-3,…yi1) and (xi,t-2, xi,t-3…xi1) as instruments.
25  
                                                           
25 Only instruments lagged 2, 3 and 4 periods will be used. There is not much additional information in going back 
further, and the tests explained below will be more stringent when we include fewer instruments in the regression. 
Those instruments will be valid when the error term is serially uncorrelated (or at least follow a moving average 
process of finite order); and future innovations of the dependent variable do not affect current values of the 
explanatory variables. Although they can be affected by the current and past realizations of the dependent variable 
(jointly endogenous). See Gallego and Loayza  (2000).  
  27  Arellano and Bond (1988) suggest a first and second-order correlation test to assess the 
validity of those instruments and the Sargan test for over-identifying restrictions. First-order 
serial correlation is expected by construction when we work with first differences of the 
variables and only second-order serial correlation will be a sign of misspecification. Our 
empirical evidence suggests that the GMM estimator in differences provides the most sensible 
results, but we also report in the Annex System (Arellano and Bover, 1995) and OLS estimators, 
given the potential shortcomings of each methodology (Mairesse, Hall and Mulkay, 2000).  
 
Empirical Results: Financial Constraints and Liberalization 
The Basic Model   
 
Table 4 presents the results for the “basic model” (equation 1) using the unbalanced panel data 
for 1,488 of the 1,972 listed and non-listed firms that provided some information in 1981-1999. 





 as the dependent variable with two lags, and sales, 
liquidity (or cash flow) and debt as the independent variables. The table reports the Wald and 
Sargan tests (assuming homoskedastic errors) and the p values for the first and second-order 
serial correlation tests. Instruments lagged 2, 3 and 4 periods are used.  
Results are compared for two alternative definitions of “liquidity”: current assets – 
current liabilities (Liq in columns 1 and 2) and operational profits (cash flow, CF, in column 3). 
Liquidity is sometimes preferred to CF under the argument that sales and cash flow are highly 
correlated, but Table 3 shows that there are no important differences between the two variables 
in this respect. As discussed above, there is no consensus in the theoretical literature in this area. 








used and, after considering different lag structures, one period lagged values (beginning of 













. Second-order serial 
correlation does not seem to be a problem in our regressions, and the Sargan test suggests that 
  28  the restrictions are valid. Formally, the Sargan test does not reject the null hypothesis of valid 
over-identifying restrictions.
26   
The results indicate that investment depends on lagged investment (+, net for the 
coefficients of It-1 and It-2), sales (+), liquidity (+) and debt (+), the three variables being 
significant at the 1 percent level. Also, as shown in columns (1) and (2) the results for sales and 
liquidity are robust to the inclusion/exclusion of debt.  
The stock of liquidity (current assets – current liabilities) gives “better” results than CF 
(operational profits). Each of the two variables in columns (2) and (3), and both variables in 
column (4) are used.  Liquidity is highly significant and has the expected (+) sign but CF is not 
significant and has the “wrong” sign. The following sections will use the specification of 
Column (1) as the “best” model.   Log-log regressions are run for this model of column (1) with 
elasticities of 1.3 for sales, 0.16 for the stock of liquidity and 0.36 for debt. The standardized beta 
coefficients are 9.3 for sales, 6.2 for liquidity and 2.6 for debt. 
The system and OLS estimators of Table A. 2 and Table A.3 are very similar to those of 
Table 4,  except for the negative (and significant) sign of D/K. However, the sign changes again 
to positive in the next sections when additional variables are included. OLS estimators also shift 
coefficients for D/K, but there is the additional difference that cash flow produces “better” 
results than liquidity. 
  
                                                           
26 Unfortunately, the values reported for the Sargan test using first differences are “too good,” equal to 1, in all the 
tables of the document, a problem which could be related to overfitting bias. The results did not change when using 
2 and 3 alternative maximum lags for the instruments. The problem disappears, however, when we work with 
system estimators in the Appendix.  
  29  Table 4. The Basic Model (Arellano and Bond in First Differences, 2 lags) 
Dependent variable:It/Kt
(1) (2) (3) (4)
It-1/Kt-1 -6.010E-05 -6.500E-05 -5.180E-05 -5.540E-05
-(2.46) -(2.69)*** -(2.23)*** -(2.20)***
It-2/Kt-2 1.127E-04 1.169E-04 1.131E-04 1.192E-04
(5.69)*** (6.44)*** (5.99)*** (6.07)***
St/Kt-1 0.030 0.033 0.034 0.030
(9.34)*** (12.92)*** (11.24)*** (9.36)***




(D/K)t 0.022 0.025 0.021
(2.61)*** (3.00)*** (2.62)***
D_Year X X X X
Number of Observations 5377 5377 5377 5377
Number of Firms 1488 1488 1488 1488
Wald Test of joint significance 733.9 733.76 786.7 798.51
Specification Tests (p values)
  Sargan Test 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
  First order serial correlation 0.000 0.0001 0.000 0.0001
  Second order serial correlation 0.285 0.2409 0.345 0.336
S: sales; CF: cash flow (operating profits); Liq: liquidity (current assets- current liabilities); D: to
debt;Kt corresponds to total assets for machinery and equipment the end of the year.
***, **, *: significant at 1%, 5% or 10% respectively; constant not reported
Methodology: outliers excluded following the rules described in Annex 1; heteroskedasticity
consistent t values in brackets; the constant not reported. The Sargan test was calculated
assuming homoskedastic errors. The maximum number of lags allowed for the predetermined
variables used as instruments was 4.
Sources: Superintendencia de Sociedades and Supervalores.  
 
The Impact of Financial Development and Reforms  
 
Table 5 adds the cross products with the macroeconomic indexes of financial development 
mentioned in Section 2. The results for sales and liquidity are entirely consistent with those of 
the previous section, but the coefficient for D/K is no longer significant. The cross products 
indicate that the financial and the debt constraints decreased with financial “liberalization.”
27 The 
results are very similar for the four financial variables used, but liberalization indexes produce 
                                                           
27 More rigorously we should talk of a liquidity constraint and a debt premium. Remember that the coefficient of 
debt is positive suggesting that indebted firms get easy credit because their good history in the bank.  
  30  better results when we include additional variables in the following sections. We also presented 
theoretical reasons for this choice in Section 3.A).  
Regressions with “size” and “activity” for the stock market (not shown) with expected 
poor results given the precarious development of the stock market in Colombia. The Wald, 
Sargan and second-order serial correlation tests are satisfactory.
28 System and OLS estimators in 
Table A.4 and Table A.5 are consistent for most coefficients and D/K is (again, as in Table 4) 
significant. The cross products between debt and the macrofinancial variables are significant and 
have the correct signs for the system estimators and also for Lora and Laeven (but not for size or 
activity) when we use OLS. 
The size of the coefficients in Table 5 indicate, on the other hand, that the financial 
liberalization had an important impact, larger for the liberalization indexes (Lora and Laeven) 
than for size or activity. Thus, the coefficients obtained would indicate that the financial 
restrictions decreased 70 percent (Lora, column 3) and 52 percent (Laeven, column 4) during the 
liberalization episode of 1990-1997.
29 The reduction is smaller but still very significant for size 
(30.9 percent) and activity (22.8 percent).  The system estimators of Table A.4 indicate that 
financial restrictions decreased 56 percent (Lora), 41 percent (Laeven), 16.3 percent (size) and 
26 percent (activity). 
 
                                                           
28 However, for the Sargan test see footnote 26. 
29 Thus, the results of column 4 (Laeven) indicate that the liquidity constraint changes from 0.0511 to 0.02432, a 
reduction of 52.44%; 0.0511 + 4*(-0.0067) = 0.02432. The Laeven index changes 4 units between 1990 (2) and 
1997 (6). For the other calculations we use the fact the size change 0.22 points (from 0.384 in 1990 to 0.606 in 
1997), activity changed 0.112 points (0.264 in 1990, 0.376 in 1997) and Lora’s index changed 0.744 (0.203 in 1990, 
0.947 in 1997). See Figures 1 and 2.  
  31  Table 5. Did Constraints Decrease with Liberalization and Credit? 
(Arellano and Bond in first differences, 2 lags) 
 
Dependent variable:It/Kt
(1) (2) (3) (4)
It-1/Kt-1 -4.27E-06 -5.87E-06 2.96E-05 1.63E-05
-(0.20) -(0.27) (1.28) (0.70)
It-2/Kt-2 1.13E-04 1.19E-04 1.34E-04 1.27E-04
(7.19)*** (7.48)*** (7.37)*** (7.98)***
St/Kt-1 0.043 0.043 0.041 0.039
(12.70)*** (12.69)*** (12.12)*** (11.68)***
(Liq/K)t-1 0.048 0.048 0.050 0.051









(D/K)t 0.005 0.005 0.009 0.012









D_year X X X X
Number of Observations 5377 5377 5377 5377
Number of Firms 1488 1488 1488 1488
Wald Test of joint significance 1223.6 1221.1 662.22 699.41
Specification Tests (p values)
  Sargan Test 1.0            1.0            1.0              1.0             
  First order serial correlation 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001
  Second order serial correlation 0.7369 0.7261 0.5825 0.3254
S: sales; Liq: liquidity (current assets- current liabiilities); D: total debt-liabilities; Kt
corresponds to total assets for machinery and equipment at the end of the year; 
Fin_Size: total assets of the financial sector/GDP; Fin_activity: stock of credit from the
financial sector to the private sector/GDP; Fin_liberalization: Lora and Barrera (1997) or
Laeven (2001); 
***, **, *: significant at 1%, 5% or 10% respectively; constant not reported
Methodology: outliers excluded following the rules described in Annex 1;
heterosckedatsiticy consistent t values in brackets. The sargan test was
calculated for homoscedastic errors. The maximum number of lags allowed for the
predetermined variables used as instruments was 4.  
 
 
  32  The Crisis of 1998-99  
 
Liberalization and financial development reduced the constraints faced by firms, and we want to 
explore in this Section if those constraints increased again during the deep financial crisis of 






−−  where 
D98-99 takes the value of 1 during these last 2 years.  As expected, their coefficients are 
significant and positive, suggesting that financial constraints did indeed increase during the 
financial crisis of the last two years. 
The results of column (1) –liberalization – seem to be very similar to those of column (2) 
–activity. The results for lagged investment, sales and liquidity are consistent with those of the 






is not significant.  The size of the coefficients indicates, on the other hand, that financial 
constraints increased 54 percent in 1998-99, with almost identical results for the Laeven Index 
and for activity in columns 1 and 2.
30 
The results of system estimators in Table A.6 are consistent for most coefficients and 
D/K is (again, as in Table 4) significant, but the OLS estimators in Table A.7 are less satisfactory 
for some variables and cross products related with liquidity. 
 
                                                           
30 In column 2 we calculate the new coefficient as 0.0426 + 0.0232; in column 1 as 0.0454+0.0249  


























Number of Observations 5377 5377
Number of Firms 1488 1488
Wald Test of joint significance 827.85 903.51
Specification Tests (p values)
  Sargan Test 1.0 1.0
  First order serial correlation 0.0001 0.0000
  Second order serial correlation 0.1838 0.5349
S: sales; Liq: liquidity (current assets- current liabiilities); D: total debt; Kt
corresponds to total assets for machinery and equipment at the end of the year;
Fin_liberalization: Laeven (2001); Fin_activity:stock of credit from the private
sector to the financial sector/GDP; D_9899: 1 for years 1998 and 1999
***, **, *: significant at 1%, 5% or 10% respectively; constant not reported
Methodology: outliers excluded following the rules described in Annex 1;
heterosckedatsiticy consistent t values in brackets; The sargan test was
calculated for homoscedastic errors. The maximum number of lags allowed for
the predetermined variables used as instruments was 4.
Sources: information on most quantitative variables comes from
Superintendencia Bancaria and from Super-valores  
 
  34  Empirical Results: Conglomerates and Multinationals 
Conglomerates  
Table 7 adds the effect of conglomerates to the variables included in the “basic” model of Table 
4). We use a dummy variable D_conglom (1 when the firm belongs to a conglomerate in 2000 
and 0 otherwise, Section 0) and cross products between the previous variables and the dummy. 
We consider Laeven liberalization index and activity in the regressions. We will confine our 
comments to column (1) of the table since liberalization seems to produce better results. Again, 
liberalization seems to capture better the impact of financial development than the amount of 
credit activity. 
The coefficients and levels of significance of lagged investment, sales and liquidity are 




 has the “correct” positive sign but is not significant.  Our evidence 








are negative and significant. It also suggests that conglomerates 
benefited less from financial liberalization since the triple cross products are positive and 
significant. The size of the coefficients indicate that a conglomerate is 53 percent (column 1) or 
19 percent (column 2) less financially constrained than the non-conglomerate firm.  
The Wald and Sargan tests are satisfactory (high): the group of variables “explains” the 
behavior of investment, and the identifying restrictions are valid. Finally, we cannot reject the 
null hypothesis of no second-order serial correlation. Results for system estimators and OLS for 
the cross products between liquidity and debt with D_conglom are not encouraging. The signs 
are as expected, but the coeffificients are not significant. 
 











Liqt-1/Kt-1   *Fin_activity -0.069
-(1.36)





















Number of Observations 5377 5377
Number of Firms 1488 1488
Wald Test of joint significance 810.67 1302.17
Specification Tests (p values)
  Sargan Test 1.0 1.0
  First order serial correlation 0.0001 0.0000
  Second order serial correlation 0.8564 0.6323
S: sales; Liq: liquidity (current assets- current liabiilities); D: total
debt; Kt corresponds to total assets for machinery and equipment
at the end of the year; Fin_liberalization: Laeven (2001);
Fin_activity: stock of credit from the private sector to the financial
sector/GDP; D_conglom: 1 when the firm belongs to a
conglomerate in year 2000
***, **, *: significant at 1%, 5% or 10% respectively; constant not
reported
Methodology: outliers excluded following the rules described in
Annex 1; heterosckedatsiticy consistent t values in
brackets; The sargan test was calculated for homoscedastic
errors
The maximum number of lags allowed for the predetermined
variables used as instruments was 4.
Sources: information on most quantitative variables comes from
Superintendencia Bancaria and from Super-valores;
Conglomerates from Superintendencia Bancaria (2000)  
  36   
The Finances of the Conglomerate and Firm’s Investment 
Do the finances of the conglomerate affect investment at the firm level? Do firms invest more 
when their conglomerate is more liquid or has a good history of debt? We calculated liquidity 
(current assets – current liabilities) and debt (total liabilities) for all the firms, in manufacturing 
and in other sectors, belonging to each of 14 conglomerates reported in Dinero in 1998 (Table 
8).
31 Two of them, Sindicato Antioqueño and Bavaria account for almost half of the number of 
firms and close to 60 percent of  sales (in 1998) of the 14 groups. 
 
Table 8. Conglomerates Considered and Number of Firms 
No. Conglomerate # firms
Sales, 
1998 (%)
1 SINDICATO ANTIOQUEÑO 67 31.2           
2 BAVARIA 36 27.3           
3 ARDILA 26 13.1           
4 SANFORD 19 5.8             
5 CHAID NEME HERMANOS S.A. 11 0.7             
6 MUNDIAL 9 3.8             
7 CORONA 9 2.1             
8 EL TIEMPO 8 1.5             
9 HAIME 7 1.6             
10 AVAL 7 0.9             
11 OLIMPICA 5 5.3             
12 COCA COLA 3 3.8             
13 CAFETERO 3 1.7             
14 LLOREDA 2 1.1             
TOTAL 212 100.0         
Source: Dinero, Superintendencia de Sociedades, Superintendencia de Valores
and author's calculations  
 












                                                          
, liquidity and debt for the whole conglomerate.  The 
results do indicate, indeed, that the firm invests more when the liquidity of the whole 
conglomerate increases, but we did not obtain significant values for debt. Our results are entirely 
 
31 We eliminated those firms that did not have information on liquidity and debt for all years of the period 1978-99, 
so we ended up excluding 6 of the 20 groups considered by Dinero. 




Do Firms Invest when their Conglomerate Increases its Liquidity or Debt? 

















Number of Observations 588 588
Number of Firms 94 94
Wald Test of joint significance 206.82 260.31
Specification Tests (p values)
  Sargan Test 0.91 0.92
  First order serial correlation -4.11 -4.11
  Second order serial correlation 0.15 0.35
i: each firm; conglom: all the firms in that particular conglomerate
Source: Dinero, 20 largest conglomerates in Colombia
Methodology: we added information on liquidity (current assets -
current liabilities) and debt (total liabilities) for all the firms in each
conglomerate
***, **, *: significant at 1%, 5% or 10% respectively; constant not
reported
Heterosckedatsiticy consistent t values in brackets; The sargan test
was calculated for homoscedastic errors  
 
  38  Direct Foreign Investment  
Not much has been done in this area to our knowledge, though it is traditionally assumed that the 
domestic affiliates of multinationals can partially use the resources of their parent company. The 
results of this section corroborate such a hypothesis, with coefficients relatively similar to those 
obtained for conglomerates before.  We defined a dummy variable with 1 when the firm has 
some foreign investment in 1998 and 0 otherwise. Again, we will refer mainly to the results of 
column 1 using a Laeven index of liberalization (more solid than those of column 2, activity).  







is negative and significant at the 5% level in Table 10, and 
the coefficients of the triple products 





Fin liberalization D and Fin liberalization D
KK
 result positive and highly 
significant.  This suggests that domestic affiliates face lower financial constraints than the 
average firm, but also benefited less from financial liberalization. The size of the coefficients 
indicates, on the other hand, that the firm with some foreign direct investment faces liquidity 
restrictions 46 percent lower than the other firms.  System estimators (Table A.10) and OLS 
(Table A.11) are not as encouraging, however. The coefficients for Liqt-1/Kt-1*D_DFI and Liqt-
1/Kt-1*Fin_Liberalization*D_DFI have the wrong signs, and are significant in some cases. 
 


































Number of Observations 5377 5377
Number of Firms 1488 1488
Wald Test of joint significance 748.38 1341.16
Specification Tests (p values)
  Sargan Test 1.0 1.0
  First order serial correlation 0.0001 0.0000
  Second order serial correlation 0.3504 0.6383
S: sales; Liq: liquidity (current assets- current liabiilities); D: total debt; Kt
corresponds to total assets for machinery and equipment at the end of
the year; Fin_liberalization: Laeven (2001); Fin_activity:stock of credit
from the private sector to the financial sector/GDP; D_iext: 1 if the firm
has some foreign investment (registered in the Central Bank) in 1998
***, **, *: significant at 1%, 5% or 10% respectively; constant not
reported
Methodology: outliers excluded following the rules described in Annex 1;
heterosckedatsiticy consistent standard errors in brackets; The sargan
test was calculated for homoscedastic errors. The maximum number
of lags allowed for the predetermined variables used as instruments
was 4.
Sources: information on most quantitative variables comes from
Superintendencia Bancaria and from Super-valores; Foreign
investment: Central Bank  
  40  Conclusions 
 
Financial constraints play an important role on investment in the developed economies where the 
financial sector is strong and diversified, and they certainly should play a larger role in some less 
developed countries, where the financial sector remains very behind. We show in this paper that 
firms are indeed financially constrained in Colombia, strongly limited by the availability of 
“external” funds despite the important reforms undertaken during the 1990s.  The liberalization 
process of the 1990s decreased liquidity and debt requirements for investment, but constraints 
increased again during the recent crisis of 1998-99.  
We do not find an important relation between operational profits – cash flow and 
investment, and we rather find that firms build a stock of liquidity before investment takes place. 
The amount of credit irrigating the economy is an important variable, but the relevant story is 
much more complex. In particular, the liberalization indexes seem to capture better the whole 
picture. A successful financial reform removes controls on market allocation and leads to greater 
access to credit, reducing the premium paid on external finance. They reduce information 
asymmetries between borrowers and lenders and facilitate the reallocation of funds between 
firms. 
As expected, we find strong evidence that firms belonging to conglomerates and 
multinational firms are less financially constrained. The conglomerate is an organization partially 
designed to cope with information and contract enforcement problems, and firms belonging to a 
conglomerate are less likely to be financially constrained; they can rely on the financial resources 
of the group.  Multinational firms, on the other hand, can use resources of the parent company 
and should be less constrained when they want to invest in new machinery and equipment. As 
expected, again, we show that those two groups of firms benefited less than the average from 
financial liberalization. 
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  47  ANNEX: THE EVOLUTION OF DEBT 
 
Table A. 1. The Evolution of Debt, 1990-99 
All Sectors Manufacturing All Sectors Manufacturing All Sectors Manufacturing All Sectors Manufacturing
90 214.6 280.5 434.3 371.2
92 230.0 234.9 355.2 276.1 92 103.2 100.6 83.9 96.8
93 220.3 217.2 330.9 246.6 93 100.7 103.2 76.0 84.2
94 207.5 198.6 290.8 235.1 94 79.2 91.5 71.2 81.4
95 212.7 188.7 269.8 220.2 95 82.9 89.1 75.7 85.5
96 167.6 174.7 244.3 197.5 96 83.6 85.1 75.0 78.7
97 189.6 185.4 252.2 196.1 97 98.9 87.6 71.8 78.3
98 181.3 172.8 226.1 196.4 98 95.1 82.9 63.4 70.0
99 201.0 175.1 244.1 198.3 99 99.3 78.7 59.2 66.5
All Sectors Manufacturing All Sectors Manufacturing All Sectors Manufacturing All Sectors Manufacturing
90 77.0 46.3 47.2 44.7
92 63.2 41.1 41.2 38.0 92 28.3 17.6 10.9 13.8
93 57.7 39.0 40.7 37.9 93 26.4 18.5 11.3 12.7
94 53.0 38.3 38.2 36.7 94 20.3 17.6 11.4 14.6
95 55.8 40.3 42.4 39.4 95 21.8 19.0 12.6 15.2
96 44.5 41.5 40.7 39.3 96 22.2 20.2 13.9 16.8
97 45.2 44.8 44.4 42.2 97 23.6 21.1 13.9 16.5
98 45.6 44.9 44.9 42.1 98 23.9 21.5 12.1 15.6
99 55.8 53.6 52.1 47.7 99 27.6 24.1 12.8 16.5
All Sectors Manufacturing All Sectors Manufacturing All Sectors Manufacturing All Sectors Manufacturing
90 55.0 45.2 49.9 48.3
92 58.1 51.1 57.1 53.6 92 26.0 21.9 15.4 19.5
93 54.1 49.0 53.5 51.1 93 24.8 23.3 15.2 19.5
94 46.3 41.3 48.3 45.6 94 17.7 19.0 13.4 17.4
95 44.5 41.6 47.0 44.3 95 17.3 19.6 15.0 18.0
96 36.7 40.4 44.1 41.9 96 18.3 19.7 14.4 17.1
97 35.6 40.9 41.8 38.8 97 18.6 19.3 13.3 15.1
98 36.1 40.5 41.5 38.1 98 18.9 19.5 11.7 14.7
99 38.6 42.7 41.7 39.7 99 19.1 19.2 10.8 13.9
Weighted Average Median
I.TOTAL LIABILITIES II. LIABILITIES WITH THE FINANCIAL SECTOR
Total Liabilities/Plant and Equipment
Total Liabilities/Sales
Liabilities with the financial sector/Plant and equipment
Liabilities with the financial sector/Sales
Weighted Average Median
Total Liabilities/Total Assets Liabilities with the financial sector/Total Assets
Weighted Average Median




  48  SYSTEM AND OLS ESTIMATORS 
 
Table A. 2. The Basic Model (Arellano and Bond, system estimators) 
Dependent variable:It/Kt
(1) (2) (3)
It-1/Kt-1 -8.003E-05 -7.294E-05 -7.622E-05
-(1.90)** -(1.90)* -(1.82)*
It-2/Kt-2 9.180E-05 9.647E-05 9.454E-05
(1.67)* (1.88)** (1.69)*








D_Year X X X
Number of Observations 7239 7239 7239
Number of Firms 1762 1762 1762
Wald Test of joint significance 165 167.6 167
Specification Tests (p values)
  Sarga n Test 0.92 0.94 0.97
  First order serial correlation (p value) -4.783 -4.85 -4.776
  Second order serial correlation (p value) -0.7698 -0.8126 -0.7701
S: sales; CF: cash flow (operating profits); Liq: liquidity (current assets- current
liabiilities); D: total debt;Kt corresponds to total assets for machinery and equipment
the end of the year.
***, **, *: significant at 1%, 5% or 10% respectively; constant not reported
Methodology: outliers excluded following the rules described in Annex 1;
heterosckedatsiticy consistent t values in brackets; the constant not
reported. The sargan test was calculated assuming homoscedastic errors. The
maximum number of lags allowed for the predetermined variables used as
instruments was 4.
Sources: Superintendencia de Sociedades and Super-valores  
 
  49  Table A.3. Basic Model (OLS) 
Dependent variable:It/Kt
(1) (2) (3) (4)
It-1/Kt-1 7.510E-05 8.770E-05 9.910E-05 8.770E-05
(0.56) (0.69) (0.72) (0.69)
It-2/Kt-2 6.350E-05 7.090E-05 7.260E-05 7.000E-05
(0.39) (0.90) (0.36) (0.88)
St/Kt-1 0.006 0.007 0.005 0.006
(11.47)*** (9.13)*** (9.57)*** (9.44)***




(D/K)t -0.012 -0.010 -0.010
-(6.46)*** -(5.36)*** -(5.29)***
D_year X X X X
Number of Observations 7433 7433 7433 7433
Number of Firms 1762 1762 1762 1762
S: sales; CF: cash flow (operating profits); Liq: liquidity (current assets-
current liabiilities); D: total debt; Kt corresponds to total assets for
machinery and equipment at the end of the year.
***, **, *: significant at 1%, 5% or 10% respectively
Methodology: outliers excluded following the rules described in Annex 1;
heterosckedatsiticy consistent t values in brackets; the
constant not reported. 
Sources: Superintendencia de Sociedades and Super-valores  
  50  Table A. 4. Did Constraints Decrease with Liberalization and Credit? 
(Arellano and Bond, system estimators) 
 
Dependent variable:It/Kt
(1) (2) (3) (4)
It-1/Kt-1 -1.67E-05 -2.02E-05 5.82E-07 -1.21E-05
-(0.71) -(0.79) (0.02) -(0.50)
It-2/Kt-2 4.46E-05 4.98E-05 6.64E-05 6.82E-05
(2.28)*** (2.24)*** (3.07)*** (2.84)***
St/Kt-1 0.016 0.017 0.014 0.012
(9.90)*** (9.96)*** (9.18)*** (8.85)***
(Liq/K)t-1 0.044 0.043 0.035 0.030









Dt/Kt 0.059 0.059 0.044 0.034









D_year X X X X
Number of Observations 7239 7239 7239 7239
Number of Firms 1762 1762 1762 1762
Wald Test of joint significance 274.4 248.2 227.3 210.4
Specification Tests
  Sargan test 0.998         0.886                      1.000          1.000         
  First order serial correlation (p values) -4.327 -4.508 -4.327 -4.353
  Second order serial correlation(p values) 0.2316 0.1644 -0.6443 -0.9168
S: sales; Liq: liquidity (current assets- current liabiilities); D: total debt-liabilities; Kt
corresponds to total assets for machinery and equipment at the end of the year; 
Fin_Size: total assets of the financial sector/GDP; Fin_activity: stock of credit from the
financial sector to the private sector/GDP; Fin_liberalization: Lora and Barrera (1997) or
Laeven (2001); 
***, **, *: significant at 1%, 5% or 10% respectively; constant not reported
Methodology: outliers excluded following the rules described in Annex 1;
heterosckedatsiticy consistent t values in brackets. The sargan test was
calculated for homoscedastic errors. The maximum number of lags allowed for the
predetermined variables used as instruments was 4.  
  51  Table A. 5. Did Constraints Decrease with Liberalization and Credit? (OLS) 
Dependent variable:It/Kt
(1) (2) (3) (4)
It-1/Kt-1 4.86E-05 5.55E-05 4.90E-05 5.05E-05
(0.66) (0.51) (0.42) (0.41)
It-2/Kt-2 0.0000035 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.92)*** (0.22) (0.38) (0.86)**
St/Kt-1 0.010 0.011 0.008 0.008
(12.25)*** (12.34)*** (11.16)*** (10.86)***
(Liq/K)t-1 0.037 0.037 0.015 0.011









(D/K)t 0.081 0.084 0.044 0.031









D_year X X X X
Number of Observations 7433 7433 7433 7433
Number of Firms 1762 1762 1762 1762
S: sales; Liq: liquidity (current assets- current liabiilities); D: total debt-liabilities; Kt
corresponds to total assets for machinery and equipment at the end of the year; 
Fin_Size: total assets of the financial sector/GDP; Fin_activity: stock of credit
from the financial sector to the private sector/GDP; Fin_liberalization: Lora and
Barrera (1997) or Laeven (2001); 
***, **, *: significant at 1%, 5% or 10% respectively; constant not reported
Methodology: outliers excluded following the rules described in Annex 1;
heterosckedatsiticy consistent t values in brackets.   


























Number of Observations 7239 7239
Number of Firms 1762 1762
Wald Test of joint significance 336.1 296.1
Specification Tests (p values)
  Sarga n Test 0.863 1.000
  First order serial correlation: -4.354 -4.528
  Second order serial correlation: -0.3096 -1.291
S: sales; Liq: liquidity (current assets- current liabiilities); D: total debt; Kt
corresponds to total assets for machinery and equipment at the end of the year;
Fin_liberalization: Laeven (2001); Fin_activity:stock of credit from the private
sector to the financial sector/GDP; D_created in 1990s: 1 when the firm was
created during the 1990s, 0 otherwise.
***, **, *: significant at 1%, 5% or 10% respectively; constant not reported
Methodology: outliers excluded following the rules described in Annex 1;
heterosckedatsiticy consistent t values in brackets; The sargan test was
calculated for homoscedastic errors. The maximum number of lags allowed for
the predetermined variables used as instruments was 4.
Sources: information on most quantitative variables comes from
Superintendencia Bancaria and from Super-valores  
 
 


























Number of Observations 7433 7433
Number of Firms 1762 1762
S: sales; Liq: liquidity (current assets- current liabiilities); D: total debt; Kt
corresponds to total assets for machinery and equipment at the end of the year;
Fin_liberalization: Laeven (2001); Fin_activity:stock of credit from the private
sector to the financial sector/GDP; D_created in 1990s: 1 when the firm was
created during the 1990s, 0 otherwise.
***, **, *: significant at 1%, 5% or 10% respectively; constant not reported
Methodology: outliers excluded following the rules described in Annex 1;
heterosckedatsiticy consistent t values in brackets.
Sources: information on most quantitative variables comes from
Superintendencia Bancaria and from Super-valores  
 











Liqt-1/Kt-1   *Fin_activity -0.073139
-(2.61)***





















Number of Observations 7239 7239
Number of Firms 1762 1762
Wald Test of joint significance 235.4 322.3
Specification Tests
  Sarga n Test 1.0000 0.8540
  First order serial correlation (p values) -4.055 -4.216
  Second order serial correlation (p values) -0.1864 -0.6895
S: sales; Liq: liquidity (current assets- current liabiilities); D: total
debt; Kt corresponds to total assets for machinery and equipment
at the end of the year; Fin_liberalization: Laeven (2001);
Fin_activity:stock of credit from the private sector to the financial
sector/GDP; D_conglom: 1 when the firm belongs to a
conglomerate in year 2000
***, **, *: significant at 1%, 5% or 10% respectively; constant not repo
Methodology: outliers excluded following the rules described in
Annex 1; heterosckedatsiticy consistent t values in
brackets; The sargan test was calculated for homoscedastic
errors
Sources: information on most quantitative variables and on
Conglomerates come from Superintendencia Bancaria; Direct
Foreign Investment: Central Bank of Colombia  
 
 


































Number of Observations 7433 7433
Number of Firms 1762 1762
S: sales; Liq: liquidity (current assets- current liabiilities); D: total
debt; Kt corresponds to total assets for machinery and equipment
at the end of the year; Fin_liberalization: Laeven (2001);
Fin_activity:stock of credit from the private sector to the financial
sector/GDP; D_conglom: 1 when the firm belongs to a
conglomerate in year 2000
***, **, *: significant at 1%, 5% or 10% respectively; constant not
reported
Methodology: outliers excluded following the rules described in
Annex 1; heterosckedatsiticy consistent t values in
brackets
Sources: information on most quantitative variables and on
Conglomerates come from Superintendencia Bancaria; Direct
Foreign Investment: Central Bank of Colombia  
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Number of Observations 7239 7239
Number of Firms 1762 1762
Wald Test of joint significance 257.3 349.9
Specification Tests
  Sarga n Test 1.000 0.843
  First order serial correlation (p values) -4.402 -4.558
  Second order serial correlation (p values) -0.232 -0.8697
S: sales; Liq: liquidity (current assets- current liabiilities); D: total debt; Kt
corresponds to total assets for machinery and equipment at the end of
the year; Fin_liberalization: Laeven (2001); Fin_activity:stock of credit
from the private sector to the financial sector/GDP; D_iext: 1 if the firm
has some foreign investment (registered in the Central Bank) in 1998
***, **, *: significant at 1%, 5% or 10% respectively; constant not
reported
Methodology: outliers excluded following the rules described in Annex 1;
heterosckedatsiticy consistent t values in brackets; The sargan
test was calculated for homoscedastic errors. The maximum number
of lags allowed for the predetermined variables used as instruments
was 4.
Sources: information on most quantitative variables comes from
Superintendencia Bancaria and from Super-valores; Foreign
investment: Central Bank  
 


































Number of Observations 7433 7433
Number of Firms 1762 1762
S: sales; Liq: liquidity (current assets- current liabiilities); D: total debt; Kt
corresponds to total assets for machinery and equipment at the end of
the year; Fin_liberalization: Laeven (2001); Fin_activity:stock of credit
from the private sector to the financial sector/GDP; D_iext: 1 if the firm
has some foreign investment (registered in the Central Bank) in 1998
***, **, *: significant at 1%, 5% or 10% respectively 
Methodology: outliers excluded following the rules described in Annex 1;
heterosckedatsiticy consistent t values in brackets.
test was calculated for homoscedastic errors. 
Sources: information on most quantitative variables comes from
Superintendencia Bancaria and from Super-valores; Foreign
investment: Central Bank  
 
  58  DELETION CRITERIA 
We followed Laeven (2001) when choosing the deletion criteria. We eliminated those firms 
belonging to the top 5 percentile when working with the 1972 firms; and the top 1 percentile for 
the 167 stable firms. Thus, for the 1972 sample we eliminated: 
Firms that operate in the financial sector  
All firms with zero or negative value for the capital stock (property, plant and equipment) 
All firms with I/K > 1.57 (95% top percentile) 
All firms with S/K > 51.8 (95% top percentile) 
All firms with CF/K > 4.48 (95% top percentile), CF defined as operational profits 
All firms with Liq/K > 12.8 (95% top percentile), Liq defined as current assets – current 
liabilities 
All firms with D/K > 21.8 (95% top percentile), D being total debt 
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